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Abstract 
 
 Herewith I try to provide the outline of a conceptualisation of emergent properties, 
which should make the acceptance of emergence unproblematic and its main features intuitive. 
In the first half of the paper my argument develops through a criticism of Jaegwon Kim’s 
rejection of emergentist ideas. This indirect procedure, coming to positive theses by rejecting 
Kim’s rejection, depends on my conviction that the core truth of emergentism is nothing 
esoteric, while its apparent eccentricity is mainly due to prejudicial ontological assumptions 
made explicit by Kim’s analysis. I target Kim’s use of both the ‘causal inheritance principle’ 
and the ‘causal closure principle’ in his criticism of emergence. In the second half of the paper a 
positive account of emergence is developed through a restoration of the ontological notion of 
quality. I contend: 1) that any monistic ontology, in order to account for phenomenal 
experience, must make room for irreducible qualities and 2) that efficaciousness cannot be 
denied to irreducible qualities for reasons immanent to our consciousness of them. The relevant 
irreducibility amounts to a priori unpredictability, due to the very nature of qualitative 
combination. The relevant efficaciousness is interpreted in terms of qualifying thresholds 
modulating the mode of producing effects. 
 
 The theory of emergent properties, which enjoyed its heyday at the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century,1 after being in disgrace for more than half a century,2 has 
become object of renewed philosophical interest in the last decades.3 In principle, 
emergentist ideas would be strategically positioned in the context of contemporary 
reflection, since they try to reconcile the widespread acceptance of monistic materialism 
with the claim of the irreducibility of life and consciousness to classical physicalistic 
paradigms. And indeed, the resurgence of interest for emergentist ideas is strictly tied to 
the growing influence of non-reductive physicalism, symbolically inaugurated by 
Davidson’s article on Mental Events.4 Yet, although the reasons of interest for 
emergentism are easy to see, emergentist theses have been, and sometimes still are, 
regarded as tainted by irrationalistic implications. 
 In the following pages we will try to provide the outline of a conceptualisation 
of emergent properties, which should make the acceptance of the idea of emergence 
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unproblematic and its main features intuitive. In the first half of the paper (§§ 2-4) our 
argument will develop through a criticism of Jaegwon Kim’s rejection of emergentist 
ideas. The choice of this indirect procedure, which comes to positive theses by rejecting 
Kim’s rejection, is due to our conviction that the core truth of emergentism, far from 
being anything especially esoteric, is easily available to philosophical reflection, while 
its apparent eccentricity is essentially due to prejudicial layers of ontological 
assumptions, which Kim’s analysis helps to make explicit. In the second half of the 
paper (§§ 5-7) we will try to develop a positive account of emergence through a 
restoration of the ontological notion of quality and against the background provided by 
the problems of scientific predictability and physical causation. 
 
§ 1. Outline of the idea of emergence 
 
 Neither British Emergentism nor the most recent emergentist developments 
belong to a “philosophical school”, and therefore they do not share any clear-cut 
theoretical orthodoxy. Nevertheless it is possible to identify a set of ideas lying at the 
core of most accounts of emergence. In the wake of some recent accounts of emergence 
we can isolate the following four characterizing traits. 
 1) Naturalistic Monism. Emergentist theses share with modern science a general 
ontological background, which is naturalistic, materialistic, but not physicalistic. As 
Clayton notices,5 the mention of physicalism turns out to be inappropriate, since there is 
no need in an emergentist framework to endorse only the specific conceptions of 
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materialism, where physical categorization plays an essential role. Indeed, assuming the 
epistemic priority of physical categories may pave the way to reductionistic accounts. 
 2) Supervenience. Emergentism is usually concerned with properties,6 with 
particular reference to properties that emerge from the “fusion”, “synthesis” or 
“configuration” of parts into a whole. As O’Connor points out,7 the relation between the 
properties of the parts and the emergent properties of the whole should be, and usually 
is, understood in terms of supervenience. A property, or set of properties, is said to 
supervene on other (subvenient) properties if it is, to some extent, different from the 
subvenient properties (novel), while being determined by them: if the subvenient 
properties are fixed, then the supervenient properties are univocally determined. The 
reverse is not true: the same supervenient property can be produced by a plurality of 
subvenient properties. Thus, supervenience is consistent with a functionalist 
understanding of the relation part-whole in terms of multiple realizability. It must be 
noticed, in passing, that the implicit mention of higher and lower levels, which is 
suggested by the use of the prefixes “super” and “sub”, is to be taken in a loose and 
metaphorical way, since it is not obvious what is properly meant by a “lower” and a 
“higher” level. Subvenient properties can be regarded as lower in the sense of 
epistemologically “more basic”, as well as in the sense of “belonging to a smaller 
dimension” (micro-macro relation).8 
 3) Irreducibility. Emergent properties are meant to be irreducible to the 
properties from which they emerge. However, the mention of irreducibility should not 
be read as tied to any specific reductionist account: well before the classical account of 
reductionism was set forth,9 emergentism was characterised by “irreducibility”, which 
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was expressed as non-deducibility10 or unpredictability of emergent properties. Lloyd-
Morgan11 introduced the distinction between emergent and resultant properties, where 
properties B are resultant from properties A if B’s occurrence can be foreseen (when A 
are instantiated) from the sole knowledge of A. On the contrary, if our knowledge of the 
properties A does not allow us to foresee the existence of properties B, the latter are 
called emergent. Although this definition is inspired by a solid intuition, it needs 
clarification from at least two points of view. First, when we talk of “predicting”, it 
seems that we have in sight a temporal order of succession between the occurrence of A 
and B respectively. However, it is not necessary to interpret the predictive relation with 
reference to an unfolding process: the emergent (or resultant) properties can be co-
existent with the properties whose knowledge makes the relevant “prediction” possible. 
This leads to the second point, which concerns the relation between epistemic and 
ontological interpretations of emergence. Talking of irreducibility in terms of 
unpredictability or undeducibility is ambiguous as to its epistemic or ontological 
meaning: on the one hand, emergent properties claim to be ontological entities, on the 
other, by defining emergence with reference to ‘unpredictability’, or kin notions, it 
seems that we are invoking an epistemic criterion (the subjective inability to predict). 
Since the kind of emergence that is usually of interest is the ontological variety, which 
is not meant to depend on contingent subjective knowledge,12 the unpredictability of 
emergent properties is often defined as “unpredictability in principle”. Yet, this 
specification does not remove all problems, since it seems that there is a contrast 
between the idea of “unpredictability in principle” and the assumption that emergent 
properties are supervenient (that is, that they are determined by the existence of the 
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relevant subvenient properties). This is a crucial question on which we will dwell 
further on. 
 4) Downward Causation. The last essential feature required by emergent 
properties is that they must be able to produce causal effects on the very ontological 
level from which they emerge. This is tantamount to saying that emergent properties 
must not be epiphenomena. The intuitive idea of epiphenomenon can be conveyed by 
Huxley’s13 famous metaphor, according to which epiphenomena are related to reality as 
the steam whistle is related to the locomotive: it occurs whenever the locomotive is 
propelled, but it does not contribute at all to the relevant propulsion. This is a decisive 
issue when it comes to discuss the mind-brain issue: if the mind is supposed to be an 
emergent property (or set of properties), then it must not just unilaterally depend on the 
cerebral substrate (upward causation), but it must also be able to produce effects on the 
brain (downward causation), without being reducible to the brain. 
 To sum up, the notion of emergent property that we want to argue for, involves 
all the four mentioned conditions, and in particular it involves both irreducibility in the 
sense of un-deducibility and ‘downward causation’, to the effect that efficacious 
properties of the whole may be absent in the parts. On the contrary, Kim’s rejection of 
emergence denies that irreducibility and downward causation are compatible. That is, he 
grants the existence of novel irreducible properties supervening on a substrate of 
physical matter, insofar as they are not causally efficacious; or, alternatively, he can 
grant the existence of causally efficacious properties supervening on a physical 
substrate, provided that they are reducible. Kim reaches this conclusion by developing 
in different texts some articulate arguments, which we are going to briefly reconstruct. 
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§ 2. Jaegwon Kim’s criticism of emergence 
 
 Kim’s criticism takes initially shape through a confrontation with Davidson’s 
anomalous monism. According to Davidson, although physical and mental events 
causally interact and although each instantiation of causality falls under strict laws, 
there are no strict psychophysical laws.14 This is the case because causality is 
understood as an extensional relation, which can be described both in mental and in 
physical terms, but only when causal relations are described in physical terms they fall 
under strict laws. The objection that Kim raises against anomalous monism rests on 
Davidson’s acceptance of the ontological background of materialistic monism, where all 
events are physical, while mental features supervene on physical properties. Kim’s 
objection unfolds as follows: let us assume that a mental event M causes a physical 
event P. If we accept materialistic monism, we have to grant that physical event P must 
have a physical cause, otherwise we should assume that P is causally produced by non-
physical events, and this would entail a dualistic picture. This assumption is named 
“principle of causal closure” and states that “[i]f a physical event has a cause at t, then it 
has a physical cause at t”.15 Now, if we grant that event P is caused by physical event 
P*, and if we remember that, by hypothesis, P is caused by mental event M, it seems 
that we have to do with a case of overdetermination, where there are two sufficient 
causes for the same event. This is hard to grant as anything more than an accidental 
condition. But if we remember that mental features supervene on physical features, a 
different option comes to the fore: we do not have separately to do with a mental and a 
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physical sufficient cause, but they are one and the same, a physical cause. This 
reasoning, which is known as the ‘causal exclusion argument’ is enough to put 
Davidson’s thesis in embarrassment. However, since we are not concerned with 
anomalous monism, but with emergence, the argument must be completed. Kim does 
not deny that mental properties, as well as many other properties that we ordinarily 
experience, are novel properties that supervene on their physical basis. In this sense, he 
easily admits that new features emerge from known ones. His point, however, is that in 
a materialistic framework we are entitled to attribute causal efficaciousness only to 
physical events. This point seems to be directly derivable from the principle of the 
causal closure of the physical world, but Kim argues for it by separately elaborating the 
idea of “functional reduction”, different from the classical Nagelian model of reduction. 
 According to Kim, the classical model of reduction suffers from the fact that 
bridge laws, i.e. the laws that should enable to reduce the vocabulary of a theory to the 
vocabulary of a second more comprehensive theory, are merely inductive (contingent) 
connections.16 In this sense Nagelian reductionism does not really yield a ‘conceptual 
reduction’, where the truthful conceptual content of the reduced theory is comprehended 
in the reducing theory.17 This problem of classical reduction is supposed to be overcome 
by functional reduction, whose steps are illustrated by Kim as follows: 
 
“Let B be the domain of properties (also phenomena, facts, etc., if you wish) serving as 
the reduction base – for us, these contain the basal conditions for our emergent 
properties. The reduction of property E to B involves three steps:  
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 Step 1: E must be functionalized – that is, E must be construed, or reconstrued, 
as a property defined by its causal/nomic relations to other properties, specifically 
properties in the reduction base B. (…)  
 Step 2: Find realizers of E in B. If the reduction, or reductive explanation, of a 
particular instance of E in a given system is wanted, find the particular realizing 
property P in virtue of which E is instantiated on this occasion in this system; 
 Step 3: Find a theory (at the level of B) that explains how realizers of E perform 
the causal task that is constitutive of E (i.e., the causal role specified in Step 1). Such a 
theory may also explain other significant causal/nomic relations in which E plays a 
role.” 18 
 
 In order to grasp the scope of the proposal of functional reduction, we must 
recall that classical reductionism entered in crisis, among other things, under the weight 
of the functionalist contention that the same property can be implemented by a 
multiplicity of different substrates. Kim’s account of functional reduction apparently 
grants that properties can be multiply realised, and requires, in order for reduction to 
take place, just that the property to be reduced be defined in causal terms efficacious at 
the level of base properties. The level of base properties is for Kim the physical level. 
Once the property has been functionalised, we should search for appropriate realisers at 
the physical level; finally, the connection between the causal functionalisation and the 
discovered realisers should not be contingent, but must be supported by an appropriate 
theory that “explains how” the realisers perform the causal task defined by the proposed 
functionalisation.  
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 One of Kim’s favourite examples of functional reduction concerns the reduction 
of genes to DNA: firstly, “genes” are defined in terms of their causal power to 
reproduce phenotypic traits across generations; secondly, the causal efficacy of DNA in 
carrying those traits from one generation to the following is discovered in the realm of 
physical properties; and finally, “we have a theory that explains just how the DNA 
molecule is able to perform this causal work.” (Kim 1999: 10) This procedure is 
supposed to reduce the apparent heterogeneity between second-order properties (like 
“gene”) and first-order properties (the physical instantiations of deoxyribonucleic acid). 
Such heterogeneity has not been really reconciled by classical reductionism, because of 
the merely inductive character of bridge-laws, whereas functional reduction is supposed 
to provide a theoretical bridge that explains how the macroscopic property of 
reproducing phenotypic traits in reality is (identical with) a physicochemical property of 
a nucleic acid. 
 Still, bridging the gap between a general property and a particular physical 
substrate does not seem that easy. Functional reduction states that if we recognise that 
property P is essentially characterised by causal power C and if we discover a physical 
substrate S to which C can be attributed, then we can posit P = S. But, as Ned Block 
(2011) notices, this passage is incorrect: let us assume that P is “being somniferous”, 
which translates into: P is endowed with the causal power C of producing sleep. Then, if 
we find a physical substrate S capable of causing sleep (e.g., Phenobarbital), we should 
be entitled to say that P = S, that is, being somniferous equates with Phenobarbital. But 
this cannot be true, since there are many other physical substrates endowed with the 
same causal power (e.g. Diazepam). This difficulty cannot be overcome by claiming 
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that, in fact, being somniferous should be equated not with a single substance, but with 
the disjunction of all sleep-inducing substances (either Phenobarbital or Diazepam or 
Lorazepam, etc.). This equivalence is mistaken because the property “being 
somniferous” refers to infinite possible embodiments of the sleep-inducing power, and 
never to finite actual embodiments. In fact, the general nature of a property, causal or 
not, is never equivalent to a list, not even an exhaustive list, of particular embodiments. 
It seems that the only way in which the ontological gap between the dimension of 
general properties and the one of particular embodiments can be reduced is by denying 
true ontological value to either;19 and indeed, this is what Kim in the end proposes, by 
suggesting the ontological vacuity of functional properties. This point is argued by 
means of what he calls the “causal inheritance principle”, according to which “[i]f a 
functional property E is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of one of its realizers, 
Q, being instantiated, then the causal powers of this instance of E are identical with the 
causal powers of this instance of Q”.20 In this sense, functional properties and in general 
second-order properties (among which mental properties) are considered void of any 
causal role different from the causal powers of their realisers (first-order properties, 
which are here physical properties). The core intuition that supports Kim’s argument is 
that causality is a relation concerning particulars only and that particulars are physical. 
This picture is philosophically well-known: causality is a relation between existing 
things and only individuals exist. It goes without saying that under these premises 
universals, ideas, general properties (and functional properties among them) are not 
ontologically efficacious, or rather, they have no efficaciousness distinct from the 
efficaciousness of their physical embodiments: as Kim states, the only justifiable role 
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left for functional properties is epistemic, since they “may play a practically 
indispensable role in our discourse”,21 but they have nothing to contribute at the causal 
level. 
 Kim’s criticism of emergent properties manifestly hinges on the causal 
inheritance principle and the principle of the causal closure of the physical. In fact, on 
an appropriate understanding of the ‘physical’, each principle alone is already sufficient 
to delegitimize emergence. The causal inheritance principle essentially states that all 
ontological efficaciousness22 inheres in physical realisers and that such efficaciousness 
is simply ‘inherited’ by higher-order properties. This straightforwardly implies that, if 
we grant that physical properties are not emergent themselves, then there cannot be such 
a thing as a truly efficacious emergent property. The causal closure principle essentially 
states that everything that might ever have causal efficaciousness on physical events 
must belong to the realm of physical causes. This implies again that, if we grant that the 
realm of physical causes forbids novel forms of causation, then there is no ontological 
room for emergence. In both cases the soundness of the arguments depends on the 
meaning to be attributed to the physical realm and to the relevant efficaciousness. But 
what is meant here by ‘physical’? 
 As we said, Kim does not deny that macroproperties are causally efficacious, or 
that there are effects of macroproperties, which are not to be found at the microlevel. 
According to him, macroproperties can be regarded as causally efficacious because 
ordinarily they are themselves physical or reducible to physical. This can only be 
maintained by introducing an extremely comprehensive acceptation of the physical. 
Indeed Kim firstly defines all entities and properties of basic physics as ‘physical 
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entities’, and then includes in the physical realm also any entity aggregated out of or 
composed by physical entities, and any second-order property defined over physical 
entities.23 In practice, this means that the realm of the physical goes well beyond the 
entities with which physics usually deals, by extending over chemical and biological 
entities, and over all entities identified by properties that are functionally reducible.24 
This makes of the thus-defined physical dimension an up-to-date version of res extensa. 
That is confirmed by Kim’s reading of the principle of the causal closure of the physical 
world, which amounts to a claim of materialistic monism, excluding only supernatural 
(spiritual) causes. In the end Kim’s physicalism does not seem to be remarkably 
different from mainstream scientific naturalism, with just a moderate inclination to 
grant a greater explanatory power to physical categories. If this is the case, then the 
physical realm is just the realm of all objects and properties with which the sciences of 
nature are concerned. 
 Now, however, we apparently have a problem, because if we accept such a 
permissive reading of the physical realm, then it becomes difficult to recognise a 
specific kind of causal relation, which should be able to account for all ontological 
efficaciousness within physics and between physical elements and chemical, biological 
or neurological units. Indeed, if we accept that there are physical causes that bring to 
light biological organisms, which conclusions should we draw about the nature of such 
causes? Should we say that physical causes ‘remain exactly the same’ when they 
operate within the biological organism and before issuing into the organism? Or should 
we say that they have become a different sort of causal relations and that we have now 
to do with specifically biological effects? And how are we going to decide between the 
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two options? The problem is that, if we do not have any clear-cut idea about the nature 
of ontological efficaciousness (‘physical causality in itself’, in Kim’s reading), then we 
are not in a position to claim that instantiations of prima facie non-physical causation 
inherit ‘nothing more than’ the causal powers of the physical basis. In fact, not even 
physics alone is especially committed to a particular understanding of causality, and 
actually physical laws usually need not refer to causal relations at all. And we certainly 
do not gain a stronger commitment to a specific reading of ontological efficaciousness, 
if we water down our understanding of the physical, by covering most natural sciences. 
 But before developing this point let us ask whether we can gather from Kim’s 
analyses, what his intuitions about the workings of physical causality are. 
   
§ 3. Is ontological efficaciousness intrinsically temporal? 
 
 Kim makes explicit his understanding of ontological efficaciousness, when he 
denies the possibility that irreducible properties of the whole affect the properties of the 
parts of the same whole. What emergentist theses need, he says, is not just downward 
causation, but reflexive downward causation, that is, a kind of causation where wholes 
are able to modify the way in which their own parts operate. Kim’s refutation of 
reflexive downward causation proceeds by separating two cases, respectively concerned 
with synchronic and diachronic effects. Here we will discuss only the first case, leaving 
the second one to the next paragraph. 
 In synchronic reflexive downward causation the possession of property M by the 
whole W at time t causes the possession of property P by parts of W at the same time 
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t.25 The objection that is raised against this case is that property M can emerge in W 
because at time t the parts of W are endowed with certain properties and have a certain 
micro-configuration, but then it seems awkward to say that such properties of the parts 
at the very same time t are in their turn caused by the property M of the whole W. It 
seems that an object can exercise the causal power pertinent to its own properties only if 
it already possesses those properties. Therefore, an instance of reflexive downward 
causation seems to defy our imagination, by representing a system where the properties 
of the whole can subsist only if they are supported by the properties of the parts, which 
are in their turn simultaneously caused by the properties of the whole. 
 This objection is undefeatable to the extent that ontological efficaciousness is 
interpreted in terms of efficient causality, with particular reference to the idea that 
causes must be antecedent to their effects. Under these premises, to conceive a whole 
that modifies the nature of the very parts that simultaneously determine its own 
existence is puzzling indeed. However, it must be noticed that it is unusual to conceive 
of the relation part-whole in strictly causal terms (rather than logical or epistemological 
ones). There is certainly something odd in saying that a whole can causally determine 
its own parts by means of a non-temporal relation, yet, one may wonder whether the 
oddness rests rather on the use of the ordinary notion of cause than in some alleged 
difficulty in conceiving the determination of parts by the relevant whole. As Craver & 
Bechtel notice,26 our ordinary notion of causality assumes the separation of cause and 
effect, because this is an operative condition necessary to carry out our experiments: we 
need first to introduce a modification and then to detect possible repercussions. But if 
we drop this specific model, we do not have any special difficulty in observing 
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instances of apparent “symmetrical efficaciousness”, where changes in the whole and 
changes in the parts co-occur in a systemic (organic) way. The point here is not 
empirical but conceptual: if we observe an instance of spontaneous change (e.g., the 
biological “working” of living cells), we are never in a position to affirm that only 
elementary parts are truly efficacious, while the relevant whole is not, at the very least 
because, logically, any change in the parts is also a change in the whole.  
 Our ordinary notion of causation is not really in a position to capture ontological 
efficaciousness as such, but spontaneously focuses on that subset of ontological 
efficaciousness that we can steer. As von Wright observed,27 sheer recording of 
regularities can never rationally justify the articulation of phenomena into causes and 
effects. Such articulation becomes properly possible only when we can intervene on the 
system and observe the repercussions correlated with our intervention. This cannot 
mean, however, that we have discovered how “nature in itself” exercises its 
efficaciousness; rather, our interference allows us to introduce in the investigated 
system a pragmatic order, which teaches us how some changes can be prompted. This 
pragmatic order dictates the articulation of ontological efficaciousness into an active 
component (cause) and a passive component (effect). The active component must be 
antecedent to the effect, because otherwise we could not separate an active and a 
passive factor, and therefore we could not causally dominate over the passive factor. If 
something in nature displays a change in its manifest properties when occurring in a 
different whole, we are likely to describe this change just as a ‘phenomenon’ and not as 
an effect, because here it is hard to distinctly make out an active cause and a passive 
effect. But if we refrain from speaking of causation in these contexts, this seems to 
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signalise a problem of how we like to interpret causes rather than the ontological 
inefficaciousness of the relevant circumstances. When we are implicitly prone to require 
that effects propagate by contiguity rather than at a distance, and over time rather than 
instantaneously, we introduce requirements that are pragmatically sensible: if my 
intervention on a supposedly isolated system produces a simultaneous effect on Alpha 
Centauri, that is nothing of my operative concern. This means that there is a natural bias 
in favour of the idea that ontological efficaciousness must unfold in terms of temporal 
propagation. There are excellent pragmatic reasons for exploring the efficaciousness of 
nature in non-holistic and temporally articulate terms, and our experiments rightly make 
any possible effort to bring to light distinct effects within ideally isolated systems. Yet, 
we must be wary not to draw hasty conclusions about the nature of ontological 
efficaciousness as such from this propensity of ours. As we will see below (§.7), there is 
a rational way to understand instantiations of ontological efficaciousness which need 
not be figured out as ‘propagation over time’. 
 
§ 4. What is inherited in the causal inheritance principle? 
 
 The second part of Kim’s argument against emergent downward causation is 
developed along lines apparently similar to the above mentioned “causal exclusion 
argument”. Diachronic downward causation should be a relation such that the 
possession of property M by the whole W at time t causes the possession of property P 
by parts of W at time t1(>t). Yet, emergent property M, which is supposed to produce 
property P in the parts of W at t1, must supervene on basal conditions P*. But now we 
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have apparently to do with two possible claims of causal sufficiency relative to P, which 
by definition should be caused by M, while P* is sufficient to determine M. If this is the 
case, according to Kim the only sensible solution is to admit that all ontological 
efficaciousness belongs to the basal (physical) conditions, so that P* must be considered 
the true cause of P and displaces M as a true cause. This does not deny the subsistence 
of instances of downward causation from M to P, but interprets all such instances as 
reducible to elementary (physical) causation.28 
 Although the form of this argument reminds of the causal exclusion argument, in 
fact it rests on a slightly different basis. The core of the reasoning can be summarised as 
follows: since an alleged emergent property of the whole supervenes on a physical 
basis, it is reasonable to think that the supposed effects of the emergent property are 
actually effects of the subvenient basis. The causal exclusion argument relied on the 
causal closure principle to the effect that, if we assume the explanatory exhaustiveness 
of physical causes, then supervenient mental properties have nothing left to do. Instead, 
the argument against diachronic reflexive downward causation rests rather on the causal 
inheritance principle: the supervenient property of the whole must inherit the causal 
powers of its subvenient basis, as all second-order properties must inherit the causal 
powers of the relevant first-order properties. In this criticism of downward causation it 
becomes explicit that for Kim supervenient properties cannot belong to the sphere of 
real efficaciousness: they are not properly ‘caused’ by subvenient properties since 
supervenience in itself is no causal relation, and they must not add causal features to the 
picture, because otherwise we would have ‘new ontological entries’ in our physical 
universe, which would mean that we admit of ‘supernatural’ powers, dropping 
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naturalistic monism. As we saw above, either a novel property is reducible to physical 
properties (and then its efficaciousness can be granted), or it is not reducible to physical 
properties (and then it must be an epiphenomenon, like qualia). Here we are 
approaching the core of Kim’s arguments, where inference yields the ground to 
intuition. He claims that supervenience implies a commitment to physicalism.29 But even 
if we grant a permissive reading of the physical and therefore of what counts as 
physicalism, this claim remains ambiguous. If he wants to state that properties that do 
not look like physical properties (e.g. mental ones) are not free-floating, but are 
anchored in the physical sphere, this is consistent with the definition of supervenience 
and can be granted. But in such a commitment to physicalism Kim includes also the 
idea that supervenient properties do not bring to light novel causal powers, but inherit 
the causal powers of the subvenient properties (which are physical properties). This is a 
much stronger thesis, which implies, among other things, that ordinary physics, or at 
least the sciences of nature as such, are committed to a specific idea of what physical 
causation is. This is certainly Kim’s view, when he contrasts his proposal of functional 
reductionism with classical reductionism. He maintains that functional reduction could 
perform actual theoretical reductions, which would not suffer from the problems 
characteristic of classical reduction: true theoretical reduction is supposed to provide not 
just inductive bridge laws, but conceptual equivalencies between the terms of the theory 
to be reduced and the terms of the reducing one. And a conceptual reduction is precisely 
something able to explain how physical realisers perform the causal task defined by the 
functionalisation of the relevant property. Yet, the idea of ‘explaining how’ physical 
causality works is somewhat opaque. Physics is not especially committed to any 
 19 
particular account of causation and laws of nature are mostly symmetrical as to 
temporal order and do not make reference to causes. This does not mean that physical 
praxis can do without the notion of cause, but physics can do very well just with a 
Humean account of causality, where causes do not have any special identity separable 
from the identity of the relevant antecedents and consequents: here no specific essence 
of causality comes to the fore. Indeed, whenever in Kim’s texts we come close to the 
disclosure of what a specific conceptual reduction should amount to, we find curiously 
evasive expressions. For example, when Kim exemplifies functional reduction with 
reference to the reduction of genes to DNA, he states in the end that “we have a theory 
that explains, at least in broad but persuasive outlines, how the DNA molecule is able 
to perform this causal task”30 or, in another occasion, that “[w]e presumably have a 
story at the microbiological level about how DNA molecules manage to code and 
transmit genetic information”.31 The vagueness of these expressions are probably meant 
to be read as suggestions that the relevant scientific knowledge is still very much in 
progress. However, the point is that even if we had a closer look at the relevant 
microbiological description we would not meet any spot where, so to say, the causal 
connection ‘displays its interiors’ so that we could grasp the ultimate reasons governing 
the production of effects. Such a conjectural dimension where causality becomes 
conceptually transparent is purely mythological. Scientific knowledge of causal 
relations is more detailed than pre-scientific knowledge, and this is enormously 
important, since it provides a plurality of ‘handles’ where we can ideally intervene to 
manipulate causal outcomes. But regardless of how detailed the analysis is, we are 
never in a position to discover more-than-inductive reasons why phenomena of a kind 
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generate phenomena of another kind. The only ideal possibility to bridge such 
conceptual discontinuities would be to discover a micro-level where all heterogeneity 
between causes and effects dissolves, but as we will see this option is properly 
unconceivable. 
 This seems to be a blind spot in Kim’s arguments: the sciences of nature are not 
committed to any specific idea of causality and are therefore perfectly compatible with 
emergent properties. If Kim wants to argue against emergence, he cannot rely on a 
settled uncontroversial model of ontological efficaciousness, but should explicitly argue 
for one. Indeed, only if we had such a specific model before our eyes, we could 
understand what the causal closure principle really forbids, by implying that physical 
events have specifically physical causes. And only in the presence of such a model we 
could see which limits are posited by stating that second-order properties inherit nothing 
but the causal powers of first-order (physical) properties. 
 Yet, this ‘blind spot’ is not really something peculiar to Kim’s arguments and it 
goes to his credit that the clarity in bringing to light the principles presupposed by his 
arguments allows making the assumption explicit. In fact, doubts about the acceptability 
of emergent properties depend more than on any specific argument, on a widespread 
tacit understanding of how physical causality (ontological efficaciousness) should work. 
Let us try now to understand features, grounds and implications for emergence of this 
tacit assumption. 
 
§ 5. Causality and the conservation of quantity 
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 To make explicit the intuition that guides Kim’s implicit understanding of 
ontological efficaciousness, we should ask what is meant to be forbidden by the 
principles of causal closure and causal inheritance respectively. In fact, they seem to 
exclude pretty much the same prospect: they forbid that new ontological entities pop up 
in the natural system of causal relations. Should we concede that entities endowed with 
causal properties may emerge out of the blue, then it may seem that unexpected effects 
could be ubiquitous, the conservation laws of physics would be threatened and 
naturalistic monism should be abandoned. Indeed, some of the most authoritative recent 
interpretations of causality in nature propose that causal interaction should be 
understood as exchange of a conserved quantity (like energy or momentum).32 This 
model undeniably captures a significant aspect of the scientific treatment of causal 
relations, where an important role is played by the ability to follow the preservation of 
some physical quantities (especially energy) along a process. On the other hand, it 
should be also obvious that this idea does not capture the ordinary intuition of causal 
efficaciousness, which does not depend on any quantitative evaluation and much less on 
the detection of a preserved quantity: if I shout to get attention, I am inclined to think 
that my voice was efficacious in producing your attention, quite regardless of any 
concern for the preservation of physical quantities. Still, the idea is that deep down, at 
the core of all truly efficacious causality there must be the transmission of a physical 
quantity. But why does the identification of a quantity look so prominent? The reason is 
apparently rooted in the classical scientific tradition and has to do with the forecasting 
aims which nourish our very interest for causality. 
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 Quantification lies at the roots of modern science and allows the exact 
registration, intersubjective control and technical re-instantiation of (apparent) causal 
nexuses. But here quantification is a methodological instance, which in itself would not 
support any specific ontological vision. Yet, historically such a strict separation between 
methodological and ontological instances has not been much respected. The ideas of 
Greek atomism have been revived by the birth of modern physics, and the qualities that 
Democritus attributed to atoms have been translated by Galileo into so-called primary 
qualities. Conceiving nature as essentially represented by primary qualities is what 
allows Galileo to famously state in the Assayer that the grand book of nature is written 
in the language of mathematics. The powerful core of this proto-physicalistic vision is 
the intrinsically quantitative character of nature, which provides a resolute justification 
to our aspirations to essential knowledge and technical manipulation of the world. In the 
Galilean universe we are supposed to have to do with unchanging quantifiable elements 
mutually related by mathematizable relations. And the guarantee that elements are 
quantifiable and relations mathematizable rests on the assumption that ‘deep down’ 
elements are intrinsically quantitative and relations are of a mathematical kind. 
However, it should be clear that the applicability of mathematics to the world does not 
require nature to be intrinsically akin to mathematics. The subsistence of regularities in 
the unfoldment of properties is quite enough to allow the fruitful application of 
mathematical devices, which are in themselves highly flexible and able to grasp a wide 
plurality of correlations. Units of measurement are introduced in virtue of their ability to 
provide constant results over repeated measuring acts and they make possible the 
quantification of worldly qualities, insofar as such a quantification is feasible. We do 
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not need straight lines and triangles to exist in nature in order to measure length by rigid 
yardsticks and to calculate topographic distances through trigonometry. 
 Now, although this point should not be especially controversial, the tacit 
assumption that nature must have ‘deep down’ quantitative character is quite resilient 
and widespread. Yet, in order for this idea to remain operant, it seems crucial for it not 
to be stated too openly, since it is far from easy to figure out what an ‘essentially 
quantitative’ world should be like. Should we imagine a universe constituted by 
perfectly simple ‘number-like’ atoms? Or a Democratean universe composed of atoms 
differentiated just by their geometrical shape and size? I do not know of many who 
would explicitly support similar views. However, if we do distance ourselves from these 
highly speculative theses, we must ask: what else could ever support the idea that the 
union of two properties always causally produce homogenous (congenerous) properties? 
But this is precisely the idea that in the natural world there is only room for ‘resultants’ 
and not for ‘emergents’. This picture is plausible just in a universe composed by 
elements which are connected only by quantitative relations, that is by relations that 
preserve unmixed and unchanged the identity of the properties of the related elements. 
If a plurality of elementary qualities are admitted, their interaction must not be 
qualitative but quantitative, that is, their properties must remain juxtaposed to each 
other and the range of their variation must concern just the degree to which identical 
properties add up producing congenerous effects. If, on the contrary, we accept that the 
relations between elements of our universe need not preserve the identity of the 
properties of the related elements, then we must grant that the interaction of elements 
can bring about novel properties, which is what defines emergence. 
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 However, why should we reject the idea that the properties of our world can be 
accounted for just by relations of ‘additive’ kind, operating over a set of elements with 
original and unchanging properties? Strictly speaking, there are no mandatory reasons 
to reject this picture, however we should clearly see its implications. Indeed, if we 
assume a monistic ontology, to preserve that thesis we must grant that there are at least 
as many basal ontological properties as there are experienced properties. The reason is 
the following. When we contrast appearance and reality in experiencing properties, we 
explain unreal appearance by assuming that subjects somehow ‘project’ delusional 
properties on reality. However in a monistic ontology even a delusional property is a 
property that belongs to reality (maybe as an event in the brain) and in principle we 
must account for its existence. The possible delusional aspects concern the actuality of 
the relations that I attribute to some apparent properties, but not the existence of the 
phenomena: I can wrongly believe that the experienced flash causes the experienced 
thunder, but the distinct experiences of the flash, the thunder and the impression of a 
causal connection must all have a place in our ontology. However, if no property can be 
newly generated in my universe, then for each experienced property there must exist 
basal ontological properties supporting that experience. This option is not intrinsically 
absurd, but if one was inclined to reject emergentist positions for fear of ontological 
profligacy, then this prospect will seem even less attractive than emergence. 
 In substance, if we want to account for the properties that we experience, we 
must provide a picture where all phenomenal properties have an ontological 
justification, and this implies that such a plurality is either assumed at the level of 
ontological elements or is generated by the qualitative interaction of ontological 
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elements. In neither case we are in a position to evict quality from ontology. Let us try 
and see what happens if we begin to take seriously the idea that quality is ontologically 
fundamental. 
 
§ 6. Quality and predictability 
 
 It is remarkable that, although the philosophical notion of quality is among the 
most ancient and revered, its philosophical treatment has been rather scant, sometimes 
controversial (Aristotle) and often disparaging. Aristotle’s treatment of quality is 
notoriously obscure, but is also probably the only authoritative attempt to articulate the 
idea while preserving its specificity. The Galileian, Cartesian and Lockian treatments of 
qualities are mostly devoted to attempts to subjectivise them and to expel them from 
ontology, where only the quantifiable aspects of quality (primary qualities) should 
appear. It is noticeable that Kant’s discussion on quality in the Anticipations of 
Perception of the Critique of Pure Reason regards quality just as the ‘reality of 
appearance’ (sensuous δόξα), which can enter scientific reality only according to its 
intensity, which is quantifiable.33 It is no less remarkable that Hegel in the Science of 
Logic substantially accepts Kant’s ontological subordination of quality to quantity by 
arguing that quality obtains proper rational position only in the form of measure.34 In all 
rationalistic treatments, quality is treated as mere hindrance for the intellect, as 
something to be quickly overcome and forgotten precisely because of its resistance to 
analysis. This attitude is understandable, but also dangerously limiting when applied to 
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ontology, because it induces to neglect or underplay some universal features of the 
world we experience. 
 When we consider ontological properties in quantitative terms we treat them as 
if they were always intrinsically prone to be submitted to algebraic operations. But, in 
fact, at least the appearance of phenomena often suggests an unaccommodating ‘algebra 
of qualities’ instead. If in ordinary algebra a + b makes sense only if both a and b are 
reducible to a congenerous basis, in a ‘qualitative algebra’, consistent with many natural 
appearances, the union (fusion, configuration, etc.) of two qualities generates a third 
quality, which may have different properties from the constituting qualities.35  Insofar as 
ontological elements are qualities, we cannot a priori adopt logical or conceptual rules 
to anticipate what the result of the union of two or more qualities is. Any composition of 
qualities prima facie resists being treated in additive or deductive terms: we cannot add 
or subtract different qualities, nor can we deduce the consequent properties. The main 
principle of an ‘algebra of qualities’ should look like:   &  = γ, where different basal 
qualities are named by the Greek letters and their non-additive union is designated by 
&. This is the ‘unruly rule’ according to which chlorine (a toxic gas) and sodium (a soft 
metal) end up yielding table salt,36 or according to which the Jamaican sweet orange and 
Indonesian pomelo yielded grapefruit. This ‘rule’ cannot depart from recorded 
experience and is refractory to the unqualified application of mathematical devices. 
 But emergence does not exclude a posteriori predictability. Insofar as natural 
processes display uniformity, we can conceptually ‘tame’ different qualities by the 
choice of appropriate yardsticks (apples and pears can be summed as fruits) and we can 
reliably infer properties in the wake of settled experiences (the union of hydrogen and 
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oxygen under certain conditions and proportions ensures the production of a 
transparent, thirst-quenching liquid). Sagacious use of well-chosen samples of qualities 
may allow the quantification of phenomena, which consists in the institution of a ratio 
between a reliable qualitative sample (unit of measurement) and objects of a class 
suitable to be thus measured. Under this perspective quantification looks like a 
legitimate but secondary procedure, which presupposes the existence of original 
qualities and exploits the peculiar traits of some of them (rigidity, regularity, stability, 
etc.). 
 In such a framework emergence of properties represents just the natural 
background, from which we may occasionally learn to extract qualities that are 
available for quantification (primary qualities and the like). This kind of emergence 
does not have any of the connotations of creation or miracle, which have often 
discredited emergence, since repeatability of both preconditions and outcomes is mostly 
possible. This means that we are not concerned with what van Gulick calls “radical kind 
emergence”,37 which would be a relation where the emergent property is not just 
different from the properties from which it emerges, but is also not dependent on them 
in any necessary or law-like fashion. This kind of emergence, while being marginally 
tolerable, cannot be anything but a rare option in our world, since it conflicts with the 
uniformity of natural processes. It must be emphasised, however, that this 
understanding of emergence is foreign to the usual idea of emergence, which is 
traditionally exemplified by regularly produced instances like the transparency of water. 
We have ordinarily to do with properties that are novel in comparison with the 
properties of the qualities from which they emerge, and that are prima facie efficacious. 
 28 
 However, even if we adopt a qualitative ontology, could we not work out a view 
supporting not just a posteriori but also a priori predictability? Granted that nature 
manifests a high degree of uniformity, could we not suppose that the novelty of 
emergent properties is merely apparent, depending on our epistemic inability to deduce 
emergent properties from the separate knowledge of their basal qualities?38 Even if new 
properties are not tied to basal qualities by deductive (logical or mathematical) relations, 
we could speculate that, if we had God’s knowledge of all basal qualities, each state of 
the universe could appear strictly derivable from the immediately previous stage. Even 
if for a human intellect complex properties in the long run could be anticipated only if 
(and insofar as) qualities are quantified, one may conjecture that superhuman 
capabilities having perfect knowledge of all elementary qualities could nevertheless 
‘simulate’ in advance all steps leading to the knowledge of all possible properties and 
states of the universe, even if they are actually novel. This would be a sort of 
determinism by qualities. Here the novelty of emergent properties would not be 
delusional, but could be nevertheless anticipated by a mind capable of individually 
inferring each step from the previously occurring qualities. This view should make us 
contemplate the possibility that the novelty produced by the union of qualities can be 
anyway interpreted in principle as a resultant. 
 But not everything is clear in this hypothesis. In particular, in which sense are 
we justified in speaking of ‘simulating’ or ‘inferring’ the new qualitative states of 
affairs? Indeed, if we grant that actually novel properties turn up, can we still regard the 
anticipatory process leading to them as a cognitive process (as simulations and 
inferences are supposed to be)? Actually, it seems that in order to learn the novel 
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qualitative outcomes of such process, the divine intellect should perform it, since in the 
absence of the recursion of identical properties this process cannot be cognitively 
compressed.39 At this point it seems that we can formulate only two (highly speculative) 
options.  
 First, we could suppose that in order to ‘calculate’ the emergence of properties 
the Divine Intellect should just run the world as it is. But this would no longer be any 
anticipation and even God should just wait and see what the future holds. 
 Second, could we not imagine that our philosophers’ God, like a superhuman 
experimental scientist, could perform ontological simulations in vitro, that is, could test 
an exhaustive set of basal qualities by separately running their combination? In order to 
support a priori predictability, this hypothesis should assume that from an exhaustive 
combination performed over a selection of basal properties (like Mendeleev’s elements) 
all properties (even emergent ones) could be discovered. This hypothesis, however, can 
be viable only by assuming that recursive occurrences of the same property in the same 
process cannot produce novel properties over the process. But from the above 
mentioned trivial principle of our ‘algebra of qualities’ we should immediately draw an 
incompatible corollary. Indeed, if  &  = γ (as defined above), then it is to be expected 
that recursively γ &  = δ; δ &  = ε, etc., where γ, δ, and ε are further novel 
properties. That is, the recursive occurrence of the same property ( ) in a different stage 
of the same process could generate further novel properties.40 If we take seriously the 
idea that the union of two qualities can generate a novel quality, then the sheer number 
of new instantiations of the union of a finite number of qualities could always generate 
newer and newer properties. Therefore the very fact that, by hypothesis, the 
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experimental set on which our ‘superhuman scientist’ operates is quantitatively 
circumscribed would in principle deny full cognitive access to qualitatively emergent 
properties. 
 
§ 7. Qualitative efficaciousness and ontological thresholds 
 
 The last paragraph should have shown that, in an ontology governed by 
qualitative relations, a posteriori predictions are possible, not a priori predictions 
though. There is however a last essential piece of argument missing, if we want to make 
appropriately room for emergence. As we have seen, Kim’s objection to emergent 
properties targeted the existence of properties which are at the same time irreducible to 
physical properties and truly efficacious. Irreducible novelty was granted to properties, 
provided that causal powers were denied to them: this is the field of epiphenomena. 
Kim is not certain about the extension to be attributed to such epiphenomenal area: 
mental qualia are certainly included, mental properties are included to the extent that 
they are not conceptually reducible to physical accounts. But if the condition for not 
being epiphenomena is the reducibility to physical accounts, at least prima facie we 
have to include in the area of epiphenomena all mental properties, insofar as no mental 
property has been ever conceptually reduced to physical accounts as yet. The prospect 
that the advancement of science will in the end produce such accounts is an interesting 
hypothesis to entertain, but is no argument for excluding mental properties from the 
field of epiphenomena, according to Kim’s requirements. 
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 However, as we said above, alleged epiphenomena cannot be foreign to 
ontological efficaciousness. On the one hand, they must be somehow caused to be and 
on the other, they must be at least efficacious enough to mislead us. It remains in 
principle possible that qualia and mental properties in general, while efficacious, do not 
have the kind of efficaciousness that they pretend to have (i.e., their content is generally 
false). Still, this reading of epiphenomena has hardly tenable implications, because our 
epistemological connection with ontology would be wholly undermined and we would 
be led to a form of radical scepticism. Indeed, if mental properties are epiphenomena, 
because only physical causes are truly efficacious, then no mental relation is what it 
claims to be: volitions do not produce actions, inferences do not logically guide 
consequences, percepts are not drawn from reality, motivations do not drive our will, 
etc. Our most fundamental methodological and epistemological instances, like our 
predilection for simpler and more comprehensive rational solutions would be just 
delusions motivating further delusions. But under these premises, as Husserl famously 
argued,41 the outcome is the complete breakdown of any claim to truthfulness, inclusive 
of the very contention that the only true dimension of efficaciousness is the physical 
one. 
 Still, even if we are finally convinced that our ontology must contemplate 
irreducible and efficacious qualities, and that the apparent efficaciousness of 
phenomena cannot be systematically wrong, the main intuition underlying Kim’s 
arguments remains standing. Kim’s exclusion argument and his criticism of downward 
causation rely on the core idea that if physical (natural) effects have physical (natural) 
causes, then we cannot invoke further non-physical causes without running the risk of 
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destroying the whole project of natural sciences, because non-physical causes could 
conflict with and exauthorate physical causes. But this threat would be actual only 
insofar as causation is taken to intrinsically require transferral and preservation of 
physical quantities: indeed, if something can be a legitimate cause only by transferring a 
constant physical quantity, then any addition of causes to exhaustive physical accounts 
would imply a violation of physical causation. In order to properly confront this idea we 
have to provide an alternative view of ontological efficaciousness. 
 Now, if we rely on what is offered by experience (scientific or not, truthful or 
illusory), we should easily recognise the ubiquitous presence in the observable world of 
selective thresholds or formal discontinuities; by that we mean the constant semblance 
that not everything that happens or change at a certain level, or in a certain entity, 
produce events or changes at a ‘higher’ level, or outside the relevant entity. We 
recognise, for instance, that not everything that happens in an atom, or a cell, or a living 
organism, or a planet, etc. produces effects outside the atom, the molecule, the cell and 
the planet respectively. And indeed, it is precisely such kind of discontinuity that allows 
speaking of the threshold between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the relevant items. We make 
experience of organisms which change physical constituents over time without losing 
identity; we detect transitions of energy levels in atoms that remain the same atoms; we 
identify molecular oscillations, without molecules turning into different molecules; and 
arrows can be thrown against the sky, without anything in the superlunar sphere being 
concerned by that. In a world devoid of such discontinuities each (putative) elementary 
event should fluidly and continuously spread its effects without boundaries and no 
entity endowed with identity could appear. Now, however, it is  must be stressed that 
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under the present premises, it is wholly irrelevant whether such discontinuities are 
judged to be ‘existent in themselves’ or just to be an ‘epistemic effect’ (due to the way 
in which subjects organise experience, or the like). Once more, if such discontinuities 
are available to consciousness, in a monistic framework they are part of ontology, even 
if their specific place in our ontological vision may be uncertain. Here we are not 
interested in ascertaining that discontinuities reside in ‘things in themselves’ or in the 
relation between things and us; in any case the subsistence of such essential 
discontinuities cannot be denied. Such thresholds, if one likes the suggestion, could be 
considered the intuitive correlate of what physics has successfully explored under the 
category of quanta. Yet, any physical technicality is here beyond our concern: the point 
is just that we have binding reasons, immanent to consciousness, to assert that 
ontological efficaciousness (naturalistically: matter/energy) expresses itself by essential 
discontinuities. 
 That said, it must be observed that the existence of such discontinuities implies 
the possible asymmetry of causal transmission, whenever a propagating effect comes to 
a qualified threshold. This means that small changes reaching relevant thresholds can 
have macroscopic effects, while big changes unable to prime a specific threshold can 
see their effects dissipated. These phenomenal traits have been object of much interest 
in recent discussions on emergent properties. Processes of amplification, like the ones 
commonly exploited by cloud chambers or Geiger counters, are often mentioned as a 
key to conceptualise emergence;42 in general non-linear processes,43 with special 
reference to positive or negative feedback44 have been considered natural carriers of 
emergence. Here, however, we are not interested in arguing for a particular description 
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of emergent processes, which could be open to controversy. What we want to show is 
that before or beyond any scientific evidence, the most ordinary phenomena, in a 
monistic framework, are enough to forcefully argue for qualitative efficaciousness and 
discontinuities in the expression of such efficaciousness; and these are traits that satisfy 
our requirements for emergent properties. Emergence here does not conflict with 
physical principles like the conservation of energy, because the novelty of emergent 
properties does not depend on the introduction of new energy in a closed system: the 
qualitative efficaciousness that we have outlined depends only on the fact that 
thresholds select and modulate already existing effects.45 In classical terms, this could 
be expressed by recovering from the philosophical tradition the notion of formal 
causation. Such a formal causation must not be read as transferral of something, nor as 
succession of active causes and passive effects: here efficaciousness immediately 
depends on the nature of co-occurring qualities. 
 At this point we should be entitled to say that room for emergence has been 
made. On the negative side, we have seen that the sciences of nature are not committed 
to any specific idea of causality and are therefore perfectly compatible with emergent 
properties. This clears the ground from the idea that there is a prior model of natural 
efficaciousness against whose background all other models should seek justification. On 
the positive side, we have seen that sheer appearances in a monistic framework are 
sufficient to conclude that qualities there must be, that they must be efficacious and that 
a model of qualitative efficaciousness is available in terms of selective thresholds. At 
this point the burden of proof is reversed: we need not anymore provide special 
arguments to show, for instance, that logical or teleological motives are as efficacious as 
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‘ordinary’ efficient causation is supposed to be. On the contrary, now it is up to the 
physicalist to demonstrate, if she can, that thoughts or motivations are either reducible 
resultants or ontologically inefficacious. 
 If we apply the above sketched model to the idea of the efficaciousness of the 
mind (as in ‘downward causation’), we can tentatively draw its main features along 
these lines. 
 First, we need not believe that the mind creates anything ex-nihilo; in this sense 
we can grant that all that the mind has available is the ‘matter-energy’ of the brain. 
Thus, mental processes can be said to be supervenient on ‘material’ processes. 
 Yet, such supervenience does not legitimate any bottom-up model of causation. 
What is especially banned is the causal continuity between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ levels, 
which makes plausible to infer from the supervenience of mind on cerebral matter to the 
unilateral production of mental events by changes in cerebral matter. Mind-brain 
supervenience shows just that matter and thought (or matter and life) belong to the same 
causal universe. When we acknowledge that material interventions on cerebral matter 
produce effects in the mental sphere, this should not be read as an ‘approximation’, 
possibly to be refined by technological improvement, of the causal determination of the 
mind. It may well be that technical improvements in neurophysiologic interventions will 
enable us to thoroughly ‘cheat’ a mind through cerebral changes, and by that means to 
induce more and more sophisticated illusions elaborated by the mind. But, regardless of 
how sophisticated such interventions may be, they could be never equivalent to ‘causing 
thoughts’: any such ‘cheating’ presupposes the living spontaneity of the ‘cheated’ mind, 
which, insofar as it is a mind, actively deals with the raw matter of ‘bottom-up effects’, 
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while being irreducible to them. The essential point here is that not all physical causes 
operating on the body (or the brain) must or can affect the mind as mind. Some physical 
causes can annihilate the mind: they are not mental events. Some other physical cause 
can be wholly disregarded and remain unperceived (in itself and in its train of physical 
consequences): they are no mental events either. Some physical causes can produce 
‘interferences’ that cannot be synthesised by the mind, while being noticed: confusion, 
tiredness, etc. can be causally produced without obtaining any objective status among 
spatiotemporal phenomena. And finally, some physical causes become objects of 
consciousness positioned in the world: this is pre-eminently the case of ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ percepts (inclusive of illusions). 
 What we call ‘activity of the mind’ should be read as the selective and 
modulating nature of the mind. We must not introduce discussions about ‘mental 
causation’ starting from what the mind does or can do, but from what the mind is. If we 
suspend the tacit obviousness that ‘the essence of causation is known’ and if we make 
room for the intuition that qualitative efficaciousness in the form of ontological 
thresholds there must be, then the mind can be said to supervene on cerebral matter 
without being either reduced to physical causes or doomed to impotence. Apparently, 
but this is an appearance that does no longer need special justification, the mind 
qualifies causation in ways that may be said to be potentially inherent in matter, but not 
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